PACE

AGENDA ITEM :

The Promulgation of Radicalization via Technological Sources Among EU Citizens

UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL

Yusuf Gökalp Aydın

KAYSERİ FEN LİSESİ MUN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Letters from the Secretary-General and Secretariat

Esteemed participants of MUNKFL'25,

As the Secretary General of MUNKFL'25, I warmly welcome you all to the fourth edition of Model United Nations Kayseri Fen Lisesi. First of all, I am pleased to say that we are continuing our work successfully, knowing that we are the pioneers in the MUN culture in Kayseri. We are truly honored to be able to present this precious conference that we have worked on for months. My organizing team has worked tirelessly for this conference, and of course, they did well. Also, special thanks go to my academic team, who also worked tirelessly to make your committees exceptional and engaging. It is with this spirit of dedication and pioneering achievement that we turn our focus to the crucial global challenges facing us today.

The 21st Century has brought about tensions between nations, unprecedented dangers, changes, and challenges that continue to plague the world. However, the United Nations offers a promising path forward. As members of the Model United Nations community, we recognize the imperative of active global engagement and the pivotal role we play in shaping a better future. Therefore, MUNKFL will simulate United Nations committees, providing a platform for delegates to engage in collaborative, competitive, conciliatory, and compromising decision-making processes. Through these simulations, we aim to foster dialogue, diplomacy, and a prioritization of societal needs in addressing pressing global issues.

May this experience leave you more prepared to lead, more committed to dialogue, and more confident in the role you can play in shaping the world around you.

Sincerely,
Taylan Emir Tav

2. Letter from Under Secretary General

Dear delegates and guests,

My name is Yusuf Gökalp Aydın and I am serving you as your USG. First of all, I would like to welcome you to the PACE Committee of MUNKFL. You must be happy to be accepted to PACE, the political vision and debates of PACE will be different. In our committee we will discuss some important issues for Europea, maybe one of the the most importants. Radicalisation is a really serious problem for a safe Europe which is what PACE is aiming for, and we are going to talk about how to prevent it. Also, each of you will be electing the judges for European Court of Human Rights. We will also discuss the technology which is undisputed most concerning agenda of concemporary era.. Finally, with my chair and co-chair, we really believe that our committee will be very enhancing and very debatable. I look forward to seeing you all. See you at the sessions!

Yusuf Gökalp AYDIN

3. Introduction

3.1 Introduction to the Committee

The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 in Strasbourg and is the oldest pan-European organisation.The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is the deliberative body and the driving force of the Council of Europe, to which parliamentarians are appointed by the national parliaments of the Assembly's 46 member States.

The Assembly chooses its own agenda, and debates current social problems and aspects of international politics. It recommends policies for adoption which are then submitted to governments for action. Governments of member States are represented at the Council of Europe by the Committee of Ministers, and they are obliged to respond to the Parliamentary Assembly's recommendations. The Assembly sees itself as the driving force in extending European co-operation to all democratic states throughout Europe.

PACE meets four times a year for week-long Plenary Sessions in Strasbourg. The 306 representatives and 306 substitutes are appointed by national parliaments from among their members. Each country, depending on its population, has between two and 18 representatives, who provide a balanced reflection of the political forces represented in the national parliament. In addition to English and French, which are the Council of Europe's official languages, PACE uses German and Italian as working languages.

Therewithal the PACE takes the responsibility for aligning the judges for ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) which we will talk about it later but briefly: Judges of the European Court of Human Rights are elected by PACE from a list of three candidates nominated by each member state which has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights. A 20-member committee made up of parliamentarians with legal experience – meeting in camera – interviews all candidates for judge on the Court and assesses their CVs before making recommendations to the full Assembly, which elects one judge from each shortlist in a secret vote. Judges are elected for a period of nine years and may not be re-elected.

Although the European Convention does not, in itself, require member states to present a multi-sex shortlist of potential appointees, in a 2004 resolution PACE decided that it "will not consider lists of candidates where the list does not include at least one candidate of each sex" unless there are exceptional circumstances. As a result, around one-third of the current bench of 46 judges are women, making the Court a leader among international courts on gender balance.

3.2 Introduction of the Agenda Item: The Promulgation of Radicalization via Technological Sources Among EU Citizens

Over the past three decades, the Internet has gone from a fringe communication technology to ubiquitous in day-to-day life. Like the rest of us, violent extremists have used it to socialise, learn, and be activists for their cause. For around fifteen years, the idea of 'online radicalisation' has been a pressing concern within policy circles and the media, as well as receiving substantial academic interest.

For many years, scholars noted that there was a lack of data-driven research which analysed the phenomenon, instead relying on anecdotal evidence and an over-emphasis on analyses of extremist online content .However, recent years have seen a substantial increase in empirical studies which, from different perspectives, attempt to understand the ways in which the Internet may play a role in the radicalisation process. As such, it is important to consolidate this research to comprehend what we know about the contemporary picture. The peak of this concern was seen during the mid-2010s when over 50,000 individuals travelled from countries around the world to join the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria, Iraq, and other countries .The high quality 'Hollywood-esque' propaganda that was transmitted via the Internet was a critical factor in their recruitment success .

However, recent years have seen an increase in the online presence of several other movements, such as violent right-wing extremists ,involuntary celibates and groups driven by conspiracy theories such as QAnon .The logic behind this concern is relatively straightforward: online extremist content (both propaganda and peer-to-peer communications) can persuade vulnerable audiences to share terrorists' worldviews, and potentially engage in violent activities.

The Executive Director of Europol Catherine De Bolle notes that 'the online environment plays a key role in this as it facilitates radicalisation and the spread of terrorist propaganda', while Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who endorsed the Macron/May initiative, said it was imperative to stop 'vulnerable young people from being exposed to terrorist ideologies on their smartphones and laptops and being drawn in' Similarly, the European Commission's 2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda notes that: 'The spread of radical ideologies and of terrorist guidance material accelerates through the use of online propaganda, with the use of social media often becoming an integral part of the attack itself' .To put it simply, the Internet offers instant communication for almost no cost, which offers groups and movements the ability to market their extremist content in large quantities to audiences around the world. This concern is often shared by the press, which frequently publishes headlines such as 'YouTube, the Great Radicalizer'; 'Beware the Rabbit Hole of Radicalization'; or 'We need to talk about the online radicalisation of young, white women' .Such stories typically suggest that online platforms are playing a key role in radicalising their audiences, often by exacerbating polarisation with their sites' architecture (such as recommendation systems). Stories in the press often present this problem in an alarmist manner; for example, former right-wing extremist Caleb Cain received wide press coverage when he said: 'because of the way that propaganda works online literally anyone can become radicalised, and you don't realise that you're being groomed into a cult'. The last two years and the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated these concerns further amongst both policymakers and news sources. They fear that the pandemic may have created a 'perfect storm' of factors – social isolation, fear of becoming ill, financial concerns, dissatisfaction with government, disinformation – which all work together with individuals' spending more time at home in front of computers, which could exacerbate radicalisation. The UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate mirrored this concern, warning that the lockdowns created a 'captive audience' of vulnerable individuals who were spending considerably more hours unsupervised online. The former EU Counter-Terrorism Commissioner noted that the pandemic also revealed the nexus between illegal extremist and 'legal yet harmful' content, which he argued can be amplified by social media platforms' recommendation systems and play a role in recruiting individuals into violent movements. News organisations around the world have repeatedly run stories which express concerns about this 'perfect storm' and the possibility that it leads to an increase in extremist attitudes, or even violent behaviours (Rodriguez 2021; .It should be clear that the policy position is not that they believe that the Internet is the only, or even primary, concern when it comes to radicalisation. There are hundreds of offline initiatives that are developed to attempt to curb violent extremism. The Radicalisation Awareness Network documents several hundred existing practices including early prevention; exit strategies; community engagement; education; family support; and prison interventions. However, as this section has demonstrated, policymakers are deeply concerned with the idea that access to extreme content online plays a key role in contemporary radicalisation

3.2.1 Historical Background

3.2.1.1 Development of Internet and Terrorists on Internet

The age of the Internet has precipitated a communications revolution and has become ubiquitous around the world. Originally conceived as a US Government project in the 1960s, it underwent several iterations before Tim Berners Lee wrote the first web browser in the mid-1990s . Since then, it has fundamentally changed day-to-day life; in 1995, there were 16 million web users, whereas today there are over 5 billion, representing 63 % of the world's population. In the EU, this is much higher; the Digital Economy and Society Index notes that 92 % of households had a subscription to the Internet in 2021 with 87 % of people using the Internet regularly. Given this momentous rise over the past three decades, it is unsurprising that terrorists and extremists have also turned to the web, particularly given that they have typically been early adopters of new technologies . In 1995, Don Black, former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and member of the American Nazi Party, created the online forum Stormfront, which remains active to this day, and presently has over 370,000 members. After creating the platform, Black noted: 'The Internet is the opportunity we've been looking for…We were never able to reach an audience that we can now [reach] so easily and so inexpensively') By 1999, researchers had begun to take note of how terrorists were using the Internet, with groups exploiting the ability to reach unprecedented audiences to spread propaganda, coordinate plans, and finance plots. Conway (2002) also warned that the Internet was becoming a substantial security threat, being used for far more than operational support. Rather, it represented a political power shift as it was the first 'many to many' communications system which underlies the power to persuade, inform, witness, debate, and discuss, while cutting out traditional gatekeepers such as news organisations. By the mid-2000s, Weimann (2004) observed that all active terrorist groups had established a presence online. He notes eight ways in which terrorists were using the Internet psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment and mobilisation, networking, sharing information, and planning and coordination. Sageman (2004) also warned about the exploitation of the Internet and how it could affect the future of recruitment, arguing that it could create a strong bond between an individual and their online community due to the immediate responses in chat rooms; a lack of moderating voices; and a prevalence towards simple ideological solutions. Within these early years, research also highlighted several case studies of terrorists who had used the Internet heavily as part of their plots. These include Buford Furrow, who attacked the L.A. Jewish Community Center in 1999 after using the web to gain both inspirational and instructional information and David Copeland who conducted a series of nail-bomb attacks in London in the same year having used the Internet for various aspects of his plot.

3.2.1.2 The "Online Radicalization"

It was not until the latter half of the 2000s that the notion of 'online radicalisation' nd attempting to understand how online activity affects individuals in terms of radicalising, it implicitly creates a cause-and-effect problem to be solved. After this point, research which posits the Internet as an important, and sometimes key, factor became prevalent .The combination of the events of 9/11 in the US, which pushed terrorism to the top of the global security agenda, and the prodigious rise of the Internet in the early 2000s, meant that online jihadist radicalisation became a political priority. Often, this was framed as young individuals who were part of a disaffected Muslim diaspora who accessed the Internet to join extremist communities that offered them acceptance .The radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki was often posited as a propagandist who could motivate Western audiences: For a generation of Western Muslim youth looking for easy answers to complex questions (often via the Internet), Awlaki helped find a way for the global jihad movement to appeal to many who may otherwise have been beyond its ideological reach. In the early 2010s, the prime security threat turned towards ISIS. As noted above, over 50,000 individuals travelled to join the group, with IS plotting and inspiring hundreds of attacks. Moreover, the group maintained a strong presence on social media; there were judged to be at least 46,000 IS-supporting accounts on Twitter and thousands of foreign terrorist fighters beamed their lives in real time back to friends and family around the world, often with the help of supporters disseminating the content widely. This mobilisation, combined with the group's reach on social media and their slick propaganda, led to a widespread concern about the role of the Internet in radicalisation – UN Security Council Resolution 2178 explicitly required states to take steps to address this threat and included a section which expressed concern over the role of the Internet 'to incite others to commit terrorist acts'. While ISIS was occupying headlines around the world, the threat from violent right-wing extremists did not go away and in recent years has seen a strong resurgence, particularly in an online context. Scrivens et al. (2022) highlight several terrorist attacks over the last five years in which the Internet played an important role, including the vehicle borne attack in Charlottesville in 2017; and the Christchurch, El Paso, and Halle attacks in 2019, Buffalo and Bratislava in 2022 During these years, violent right-wing extremists grew and maintained a substantial online presence. For example, Atomwaffen Division – a neo-Nazi accelerationist movement made up of a range of cells in America, Europe, and elsewhere – emerged from the Iron March forum. Like IS, it rose to notoriety 'because of its impressive and highly sophisticated propaganda operation, spearheaded by well-produced videos of the group's 'hate camp[s]'… in the American wilderness'came to prominence in policy and research circles. This is because the word 'radicalisation' had not been particularly prevalent until after the London bombings of 7 July 2005 Prior to this, topic had been focused on 'root causes' of terrorism – i.e. the conditions in society or an individual that may trigger or act as a catalyst for violence .In a literature review of 200 articles which include the term 'online radicalisation', the first returned publication date was 2006.

Previous topic had explored the ways in which terrorists had used the Internet, but by switching focus to a process nd attempting to understand how online activity affects individuals in terms of radicalising, it implicitly creates a cause-and-effect problem to be solved. After this point, topic which posits the Internet as an important, and sometimes key, factor became prevalent. The combination of the events of 9/11 in the US, which pushed terrorism to the top of the global security agenda, and the prodigious rise of the Internet in the early 2000s, meant that online jihadist radicalisation became a political priority. Often, this was framed as young individuals who were part of a disaffected Muslim diaspora who accessed the Internet to join extremist communities that offered them acceptance. The radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki was often posited as a propagandist who could motivate Western audiences: For a generation of Western Muslim youth looking for easy answers to complex questions (often via the Internet), Awlaki helped find a way for the global jihad movement to appeal to many who may otherwise have been beyond its ideological reach (In the early 2010s, the prime security threat turned towards IS. As noted above, over 50,000 individuals travelled to join the group, with IS plotting and inspiring hundreds of attacks. Moreover, the group maintained a strong presence on social media; there were judged to be at least 46,000 IS-supporting accounts on Twitter and thousands of foreign terrorist fighters beamed their lives in real time back to friends and family around the world, often with the help of supporters disseminating the content widely .This mobilisation, combined with the group's reach on social media and their slick propaganda, led to a widespread concern about the role of the Internet in radicalisation – UN Security Council Resolution 2178 explicitly required states to take steps to address this threat and included a section which expressed concern over the role of the Internet 'to incite others to commit terrorist acts'. While IS was occupying headlines around the world, the threat from violent right-wing extremists did not go away and in recent years has seen a strong resurgence, particularly in an online context. Scrivens et al. (2022) highlight several terrorist attacks over the last five years in which the Internet played an important role, including the vehicle borne attack in Charlottesville in 2017; and the Christchurch, El Paso, and Halle attacks in 2019, Buffalo and Bratislava in 2022 During these years, violent right-wing extremists grew and maintained a substantial online presence. For example, Atomwaffen Division – a neo-Nazi accelerationist movement made up of a range of cells in America, Europe, and elsewhere – emerged from the Iron March forum. Like IS, it rose to notoriety 'because of its impressive and highly sophisticated propaganda operation, spearheaded by well-produced videos of the group's 'hate camp[s]'… in the American wilderness'. Which are getting us closer to concemporary radicalizations which were promulgated via technology.

3.2.1.3 COVID-19 Era

While discussions and models have emerged over several decades surrounding the threats posed by a pandemic crisis, the outbreak of COVID-19 has demonstrated the unfortunate impact potential of such crises on our daily lives across the globe. As physical lockdowns became the norm, cybercrime became more popular than before. There is no denying that the arrival of COVID-19 was a crucial factor in any development discussed with respect to 2020. However, COVID-19 in connection to cybercrime needs to be placed within its context. If anything, COVID-19 demonstrated how cybercrime – at its core – remains largely the same but criminals change the narrative. They adapt the specifics of their approach to fit the societal context as a means to enhance their rate of success. This is not new, in many ways this is business as usual. The difference with COVID-19 is that due to the physical restrictions enacted to halt the spread of the virus, with a subsequent increase in working from home and remote access to business resources, many individuals and businesses that may not have been as active online before the crisis became a lucrative target. Traditional cybercrime activities such as phishing and cyber-enabled scams quickly exploited the societal vulnerability as many citizens and business were looking for information, answers and sources of help during this time. There were even more challenges for both individuals and business as teleworking during the pandemic became the norm. With the expansion of the online crimes policymakers have expressed grave concerns that the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing lockdowns may have created the 'perfect storm' of radicalisation, with millions of people spending countless hours in front of computer screens unsupervised, which may add to a range of grievances and stressors that people were experiencing. It should be underscored that two years into the pandemic is far too soon to make firm judgements about the long-term effects, however, we have started to see studies that can give some indication. To begin with radicalisation more broadly, there is good reason to think that the material conditions brought about by the pandemic may include exacerbating factors. Marone (2021) outlines a range of factors that the academic literature suggest may be problematic, including loss and trauma; psychological distress; and high levels of uncertainty. Ackerman and Peterson (2020) also point to a range of factors that are congruent with the radicalisation literature: dislocation from daily lives, the loss of loved ones, loss of jobs, and uncertainty about the future. These factors could, they argue, lead to individuals being susceptible to extremist messaging which blames out-groups for their crises. Salman and Gill (2020) highlight a range of stressors that could increase vulnerability, such as isolation or mental health issues; economic factors (like those outlined above); or disruption in careers or education. These factors may coincide with more exposure to radical environments online which could lead to more support for violent extremism. This view is taken by Malik (2020) who argues that people would make sense of the crisis by engaging with fake news, conspiracy theories, and extremist materials online, which may exacerbate radicalisation. It is also clear that extremist groups and movements have attempted to exploit the crisis by adapting their propaganda narratives to incorporate the pandemic.

Jihadist groups such as ISIS were vocal and used it as an opportunity to call for attacks, while al-Qaeda (AQ) framed it as an opportunity to recruit new members – both groups gloated and said that it was divine retribution Europol (2021b) outlined three main narratives from jihadist groups:

i) the negative impact on Western societies;

ii) blaming Governments for the pandemic and framing a return to Islam as the solution and;

iii) providing health and hygiene guidance to their supporters to demonstrate governance capabilities.

Research has demonstrated that right-wing extremists adopted a similar approach; for example, conspiratorial COVID-19 narratives were present in French and German online ecosystems. Studies on Telegram also show the prevalence of such narratives; Gallagher and O'Connor (2021) and Schulze et al. (2022) both find that right-wing extremist conspiracy theories were rife on the platform in Irish and German groups respectively. Two reports into online activity in the US and Canada both found evidence to suggest that searches for white supremacist keywords increased after lockdowns were introduced. Similarly, Davies, Wu, and Frank (2021) found that traffic on rightwing extremist and involuntary celibate (Incel) forums showed a demonstrable increase in posting behaviours. There are also some case studies of violent extremist plots that may suggest that COVID-19 grievances are important. Conway, Watkin, and Looney (2022) discuss the case of Jürgen Conings who was arrested in 2021 for attempted murder and illegal possession of weapons because he was alleged to be involved in threats to kill Marc Van Ranst, a Belgian virologist. They also point to the case of 'Mario N' who is accused of murdering a 20-year-old petrol station employee who refused him service for not wearing a mask. The alleged killer was active within the right-wing extremist online ecosystem and had expressed a rejection of lockdown policies. The family of the man accused of the attacks in Buffalo, NY, have also highlighted COVID-19 as a key factor, stating that the paranoia surrounding the virus, combined with the fact that he was spending all day on the Internet in isolation, could have exacerbated his radicalisation. Despite these well-founded concerns and case studies, there is good reason to be cautious of the idea of 'COVID-19 online radicalisation.' .

3.2.2 Concemporary Radicalization in Europe via Technological Promulgation

Most of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe over the last few years were European citizens, born in Europe and radicalised without leaving their home countries.
Radicalisation might happen for different reasons, including religious beliefs, ideologies, political beliefs and prejudices against particular groups of people. The radicalisation of young people continues to be an important concern.
People might be radicalised in different ways: by family members or friends, through direct contact with extremist groups or through the internet.
Online communication technologies have made it easier for terrorists to communicate across borders and have amplified terrorist propaganda and the spread of extremism. Terrorists use social media and the dark web to radicalise, recruit, incite to violence and facilitate the carrying out of terrorist attacks.
Over the last few years, encrypted messaging applications, such as WhatsApp or Telegram, have been widely used to spread terrorist propaganda and to coordinate and plan attacks.While prisons remain the most fertile ground for radicalisation, some extremist groups have also been recruiting people in schools, universities and places of worship… If we try to list the attacks as we made in previous parts, it would much more diffucult for us because the attacks and radicalization propagandas are going so on. New groups arise, old groups emerge again. The online society will keep radicalizated without any preventations. In lieu of talking about new groups on this concemporary part, i would like to talk about the taken preventations by EU; On 29 April 2021, the EU adopted a regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online.Competent authorities in the member states have the power to issue removal orders to hosting service providers requiring them to remove terrorist content or disable access to it in all member states. Internet platforms then have to remove or disable access to such content within one hour.

The rules apply to all providers offering services in the EU, whether or not they have their main establishment in one of the member states. Hosting service providers exposed to terrorist content need to take specific measures to address the misuse of their platforms and to protect their services against the dissemination of terrorist content. The decision as to the choice of measures remains with the hosting service provider.

The new regulation targets content such as texts, images, sound recordings or videos, including live transmissions, that:

i)incite or contribute to terrorist acts

ii)provide instructions on how to commit offences

iii)solicit participation in terrorist groups

The legislation also provides a definition of terrorist content and clearly sets out its scope in order to ensure full respect of fundamental rights. It also includes effective remedies for both content providers and service providers to submit a complaint when content has been removed. Thoose rules are getting applied by EU countries since June 7 2022.

4. Major Parties Involved

In this part we will be introducing the major parties involved at our agenda and the ones affected by our agenda, deeply;

1: European Union (EU): The European Union is a supranational political and economic union that consists of 27 member states that are located mostly in Europe. The Union has a total area of 4,233,255 km2 and a population of more than 450 million since. The EU is often described as a sui generis political entity combining characteristics of both a federation and a confederation. The EU's counter-radicalization policy goes back to 2004, when the term 'radicalization' was used in a public EU document for the first time. After that document, policymakers have gone a long way from focusing almost especially on jihadist terrorism to adopting a much clearer view, to take account of various forms of 'violent extremism'. Experts describe the radicalization process as an asset of stages and use models to illustrate how someone might go through these stages before becoming a terrorist. However, they disagree on the role of specific factors in this process, such as ideology. Some have pointed to the undesired consequences of policies targeting radicalization and questioned the concept's suitability as a tool to advance our understanding of terrorism. With the notable exception of rules on terrorist content online, EU action to prevent radicalization s essentially non-legislative. The EU supports its Member States in countering radicalization by coordinating their activities and facilitating information sharing and the exchange of best practice. The latter has mostly taken place within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), an umbrella network connecting 'first-line practitioners – including youth workers, local authority representatives and prison officers – from across the EU. Projects tackling radicalization receive funding from a range of EU funds and programmes, such as the Internal Security Fund and the EU's framework programme for research and innovation (Horizon Europe). The scope of EU activities is very broad, going beyond counter-terrorism policy and extending to areas such as education, employment, and social inclusion. However, this comprehensive approach faces competence limitations: some of these areas are outside the EU's remit, while in others the EU only plays a secondary role, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. The European Commission's direct engagement with local and regional players – which is characteristic of its counterretaliation efforts – has led to tensions with the Member States, who have, over time, increasingly demanded a greater say in defining policy priorities. The EU has responded by restructuring the RAN(RAN was archived in 2024 and later became the Eu Knowledge Hub) and creating some additional cooperation structures to ensure the Member States' participation.

1.1 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Pace): The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is the parliamentary arm of the Council of Europe, a 46-nation international organisation dedicated to upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Assembly is made up of 306 members drawn from the national parliaments of the Council of Europe's member states and meets four times a year for week-long plenary sessions in Strasbourg. It is one of the two statutory bodies of the Council of Europe, along with the Committee of Ministers, the executive body representing governments, with which it holds an ongoing dialogue. However, it is the Assembly which is usually regarded as the "motor" of the organisation, holding governments to account on human rights issues, pressing states to maintain democratic standards, proposing fresh ideas and generating the momentum for reform In a working report on extremism. PACE proposes a number of concrete measures to prevent online radicalization: such as cooperation between internet-industry/service-

providers, state authorities and civil society to produce “powerful and attractive” counter-narratives to hate speech and radicalization..

1.2: EU Internet Forum (EUIF): In the year 2000, few years after the creation of the World Wide Web, three members from the European Parliament-James Elles (United Kingdom), Erika Mann (Germany) and Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (Netherlands)- created the European Internet Forum (EIF) to create a European Parliament led network of digital policy stakeholders and a neutral, transparent and non-partisan platform to understand the internet and its impact on European Economy, society and governance. European Internet Forum’s mission is supporting European political leadership and improving the European and multilateral policies that's responsible for the political, economic and social challenges of worldwide digital transformation and to help the European Parliament to ensure that Eu policies are fit to the new digital world.

1.3: EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU): The Eu IRU is a Europol’s European Counter Terrorist Centre (ECTC) based organization, its mission is to detect, analyse and refer publicly available terrorist contents such as violent acts, Neo-Nazi and extremist forums etc. The EU IRU is aiming to restrict accessibility to this kind of content and facilitate crime attribution and the prosecution of perpetrators. The Eu IRU is also contributing the Eu with providing operational support to counterterrorism cases with online components.Also Eu IRU develops tools and techniques to help detect and destroy violent extremist content online. 1.4: Eu Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalization: In the year 2024, The European Commission launched the Eu Knowledge Hub on Prevention and Radicalization to face the complex issues faced by the P/CVE community by bringing policymakers, researchers and practitioners together to help Eu face these problems. The Eu Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalization is aiming to support the development of policies and strategies based on shared knowledge and experience. It creates an environment of collaboration among stakeholders to address the challenges of radicalization and hoping for an integrated policy-driven approach and a new online society perspective. 1.5: Europol: Europol, officially the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, is the law enforcement agency of the European Union (EU). Established in 1998, it is based in The Hague, Netherlands, and serves as the central hub for coordinating criminal intelligence and supporting the EU's Member States in their efforts to combat various forms of serious and organized crime, as well as terrorism. Europol's main objective is to enhance the effectiveness and cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the EU member states. To achieve this, Europol facilitates the exchange of information and intelligence, provides analytical support, and offers specialized training and expertise. Some of the key areas of focus for Europol include drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering, and counterterrorism.

2: ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria): Since its appearance in 2013, ISIS quickly gained notoriety as a terror network, arguably due to the savagery It demonstrated against its enemies and people under its control. Concurrently, ISIS appeared to quickly recognize the importance of digital communication tools in its self-proclaimed goal to establish a global Caliphate. Images of savagery were broadcasted virally through social media networks and global media and were clearly intended to frighten enemies and lead to further gains on the ground in both Syria and Iraq. Twitter, YouTube and Just paste were extensively utilized by ISIS to conduct its information operations, for the purpose of producing and disseminating propaganda videos for potential recruits and spread its radical views among Muslim youth globally. The role of social media platforms in aiding terror organizations has been examined extensively by scholars, journalists and think tanks. For example, the former Google CEO Eric Schmitt

pointed out that ISIS and its supporters are “producing as many as 90,000 tweets and other social media responses every day”. The importance of utilizing media by terror networks was highlighted by Philip Sieb and Dana Janbek, who argued that media is the oxygen of terrorism. Furthermore, Abdel Bari Atwan argues that the internet helped ISIS to achieve its recruiting objectives and territorial ambitions in a short time. That is, digital communication tools “allow terrorist groups to become regional or even global players [they] also allow terrorists to work more effectively to protect communications” Many scholars have observed the relation between the emergence of anonymous sharing portals and the wide spread of terror narratives. For instance, Alvares and Dahlgern have highlighted the role played by web 2.0 platforms in the pervasiveness of terror narratives by creating space for uncensored violent content.[17] File- sharing portals, videos, and personal spaces are used to target different audiences, namely, supporters, public opinion and enemies. This observation is also corroborated by Klausen, when he argues that the “jihadist insurgents in Syria and Iraq use all manner of social media apps and file-sharing platforms, most prominently Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Pal Talk, kik, viper, JustPaste.it, and Tumblr”.

2.2 ISIS’s Black Boxes

2.2.1 Justpaste.it: Justpaste.it is a free content sharing portal providing document storage and file sharing services under the motto of ‘sharing text and images the easy way’. The site is hosted by Cloud Flare and owned by Polish entrepreneur Mariusz Zurawek, who sums up justpaste.it as follows: “You are able to do what you want with almost two clicks. It doesn’t require registration, it isn’t searchable and access to specific content is only available via a link or if it makes the ‘most popular’ page”.[37] However, early 2014 ISIS has harnessed this service to disseminate itsonline videos, brutal images of beheadings, texts that aim to spread its radical ideology, and most importantlyThe controversial digital edition of the ISIS online magazine ‘Dabiq’. Since its emergence in July 2014, Dabiq washosted by justpaste.it, and archive.org. The English language magazine ostensibly targets Western audiences to garner new recruits.

2.2.2 Sendvid.com: Sendvid.com: Sendvid is an instant video upload portal used by ISIS to route around wide account suspension and content deletion on YouTube and Daily Motion. Specifically, ISIS media production outlets such as Al-Hayat, al-Furqan, and alEtisam extensively used the video uploading portal in their propaganda dissemination. High-definition quality videos such as Flames of War, Message Covered with Blood, and Healing of the Hearts were first uploaded to Sendvid, and then popularized virally through Twitter follower networks. A simple search for Sendvid on Twitter returns mostly links to ISIS propaganda videos. Sendvid is a crucial element of ISIS’s information logistics as videos linked to Sendvid can also be shared via other social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, archive.org, Tumblr, Telegram, dump.to and email, or can be stored in users’ Google drive or Dropbox for future retrieval.Sendvid has been used by ISIS affiliates early 2015 to widely copy and aggregate propaganda materials, thus building publicly available collections of terrorist-related content. As Remzy Mahzam points out, “the electronic digitisation of the extremist identity of ISIS has been made effective through its frequent injection of videos, incessant release of periodicals and downloading of visual reports in multiple languages, eventually building up a digital compendium that will remain accessible for future generations for reference”. Furthermore, unlike YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, where admins are alerted to remove both jihadi content and the associated accounts, Sendvid is a safely unpoliced archiving platform where data can be uploaded anonymously even under false Facebook, Twitter or Google accounts.

5.Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights;

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe elects the judges of the European Court of Human Rights, providing them with democratic legitimacy.

According to the European Convention on Human Rights, judges must "be of high moral character and possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence".

To ensure these standards are met, there are two phases to the election process – firstly a national selection procedure, in which each State party chooses a list of three qualified candidates, and secondly the election procedure undertaken by the Assembly, in which a special parliamentary committee assesses the qualifications of the three candidates, as well as the fairness of the national selection procedure, before the Assembly proceeds with the election.

5.1 National selection procedures – transmission of a list of three candidates;

When selecting their three candidates, States should ensure that their national procedure is fair and transparent, for example by issuing public and open calls for candidates. All candidates must have appropriate legal qualifications and experience and must have an active knowledge of either English or French – the languages in which Court judgements are drafted – and at least a passive knowledge of the other language.

To ensure gender-balance on the Court, States are also asked to put forward at least one candidate from each sex. Single-sex lists of candidates are only accepted when the candidates belong to the sex which is under-represented in the Court (i.e. the sex to which under 40% of the total number of judges belong), unless the Committee on the Election of Judges finds by a majority of two-thirds that exceptional circumstances justify an exception.

To help ensure candidates are fully qualified, an advisory panel of experts offers governments confidential advice on potential candidates before the final list of three is sent to the Assembly. Once the Assembly has received the list of candidates, the Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights – a special parliamentary committee whose members have legal experience – firstly assesses the fairness and transparency of the national procedure used to select them. It then interviews each of the candidates in person and scrutinises their CVs, which are submitted in a standardised format, to evaluate whether all three are sufficiently well qualified to do the job. If it finds all the conditions are met, the committee draws up a recommendation for the Assembly indicating which candidate or candidates it believes are the strongest. If not, it can recommend that a State be asked to submit a fresh list. The Assembly – made up of 306 parliamentarians – then proceeds to vote on the candidates in a secret ballot, held during plenary sessions, in the light of the committee's recommendations. An absolute majority of votes cast is required in the first round. If this is not achieved, a second round is held and the candidate with the most votes is duly elected to serve on the Court for a single term of nine years.

6. Key Words / Concepts;

1. Institutions;

Council of Europe

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)

Committee of Ministers

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)

Judge Election Process

National Selection Procedures

Advisory Panel of Experts

EU

Europol

European Internet Forum (EIF)

EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU)

EU Knowledge Hub

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

Horizon Europe

Internal Security Fund

2.Main Agenda and Teorical Concepts

Radicalization

Online Radicalization

Technological Promulgation

Extremist Content

Online Propaganda

Terrorist Guidance Material

Polarisation

Vulnerable Audiences

Conspiracy Theories

Hate Speech

Counter-narratives

3.Historical/Technical Concepts

Development of Internet

Early Adopters

Stormfront

Psychological Warfare

Propaganda

Data Mining

Fundraising

Recruitment and Mobilisation

Networking

Planning and Coordination

Many-to-many communication

Root Causes of Terrorism

4.Organizations and Movments;

ISIS

IS-supporting accounts

Al-Qaeda (AQ)

Violent Right-Wing Extremists

Atomwaffen Division

Neo-Nazi Accelerationism

Incel

QAnon

5.Platforms and Technological Devices

Justpaste.it

Sendvid.com

Twitter

YouTube

Telegram

Dark Web

Encrypted Messaging Applications

WhatsApp

Archive.org

7. Bibliography/ References

https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/internet_organised_crime_threat_assessment_iocta_2020.pdf

https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/RAN-online-radicalisation_en.pdf

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/preventing-radicalisation/#radicalisation

https://www.bundestag.de/en/europe/international/interparl_orga/eurorat

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary_Assembly_of_the_Council_of_Europe

https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/offices/uk-parliamentary-assemblies/pace-uk/

https://pace.coe.int/en/pages/session-202511

https://pace.coe.int/en/pages/committee-30/committee-on-the-election-of-judges-to-the-european-court-of-human-rights

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26343748?seq=1

https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc/eu-internet-referal-unit-eu-iru

https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran_en

https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-union-internet-forum_en